A significant task faced by mortgage bankers attempting to profit from the mortgage secondary market is the best execution problem. This paper built a formal model to perform the best execution analysis. The model offers secondary marketing functionality including the loan-level best execution, guarantee fee buy-up/buy-down, and base/excess servicing fee. The model is formulated as a mixed integer programming problem. The case study shows that a realistic large-scale mixed-integer problem can be solved in an acceptable time (15 seconds) by CPLEX-90 solver on a PC.
Introduction
Mortgage originators underwrite mortgages in the primary market. These mortgages bring fixed income cash flows to their owners. Besides keeping the mortgages as a part of the portfolio, a mortgage banker may sell the mortgages to other mortgage buyers or securitize the mortgages by pooling them into a mortgage-backed security (MBS) in the secondary market. The process that optimizes the mortgage assignments in the secondary market is known as the "Best Execution" strategy.
Three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mae, and Ginnie Mae) provide different types of MBS swap programs in which mortgage bankers pool their mortgages into an appropriate MBS. Mortgages must meet certain standards to be eligible for pooling into a MBS.
Usually, mortgage bankers prefer to pool mortgages into a MBS to get higher revenue. They sell mortgages as a whole loan only because those mortgages do not qualify for securitization. GSEs who issue the mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) provide insurance against the default risk and charge a guarantee fee. This paper considers that each mortgage may be either sold as a whole loan or pooled into a MBS.
We focus on the pass-through MBS swap programs provided by Fannie Mae. In particular, if a mortgage is sold as a whole loan, then the mortgage banker gets the price of the mortgage from the sale. On the other hand, if a mortgage is pooled into a MBS, the mortgage is securitized. The MBS investors, who buy the MBS, pay the price of the MBS to the mortgage banker. When a mortgage is pooled into a MBS, besides assigning the mortgage into the MBS with the proper coupon rate, mortgage bankers consider the guarantee fee buy-up/buy-down and mortgage servicing sell/retain features to maximize their total revenue. We built a model to solve the best execution problem. The model is quite flexible and can be adjusted for different requirements of the mortgage securitization program. A case study shows that a realistic large-scale best execution problem can be solved in acceptable time by CPLEX-90 solver on a PC.
Problem description
Best execution is a central problem of mortgage secondary marketing. Mortgage bankers originate mortgages in the primary market and dispose of the mortgages in the secondary market to maximize their revenue. In the secondary market, each mortgage can be executed in two ways, either pooled into a MBS, or sold as a whole loan.
Mortgage bankers may sell mortgages at the price higher than the par value 3 and get revenue from selling the mortgages. They may also pool the mortgages into MBSs. The participants in the MBS market can be categorized into five groups: borrowers, mortgage bankers, mortgage servicers, MBS insurers, and mortgage investors. The relationship and the cash flow between these five participants in the pass-through MBS market is shown in Figure 1 . The MBS investors pay the price of the MBS and get the MBS with the coupon rate equal to the mortgage note rate minus the sum of the servicing fee and the guarantee fee. Mortgage bankers get the payments from MBS investors. These payments can be used to originate more mortgages in the primary market. Fannie Mae purchases and swaps more than 50 types of mortgages on the basis of standard terms.
This paper focuses on pass-through MBS swaps of 10-, 15-, 20-and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages.
Mortgages must meet certain standards to be eligible for sale or swapping. Fannie Mae's MBS program has its own requirements, but provides flexibility in matching loan originations processing requirements. Mortgages must be pooled separately by the time to maturity. For instance, 30-year fixed-rate mortgages are separated from 15-year fixed-rate ones. The pass-through rate, or MBS coupon rate, generally trades on the half percent (4.5%, 5.0%, 5.5%, etc.) and mortgage lenders take advantage of pooling their loans to possible MBS coupon rate options. The mortgage note rate in each pool must support the pass-through rate plus minimum servicing fee plus the guarantee fee required by Fannie Mae. Therefore, the pass-through rate must satisfy the following equality:
Mortgage note rate = Servicing Fee + Guarantee Fee + MBS coupon rate.
Guarantee fee
Mortgage bankers negotiate the guarantee fee with Fannie Mae. The guarantee fee is a fixed pass-through MBS by buying down the guarantee fee to 0.125% from 0.25% and paying Fannie Mae the present value of equivalent of the 0.125% difference and maintaining the 0.25% minimum servicing fee. 
The servicing fee plan
The mortgage servicing fee consists of the base servicing fee and the excess servicing fee.
Base servicing fee
Mortgage servicers retain the base servicing fee each month as compensation for the collection and remittance of borrowers' monthly mortgage payments. The base servicing fee is a fixed percentage (generally 25 bp) of the outstanding mortgage balance, and declines over time as the mortgage balance amortizes. Mortgage bankers may retain the base servicing fee and provide mortgage services. They may also sell the servicing to mortgage servicers and get revenue from selling the servicing. Suppose the mortgage servicing is sold, the mortgage servicer will get the base servicing fee and provide the servicing.
Excess servicing fee
If a mortgage is pooled into a MBS with a certain coupon rate, it has excess servicing fee equal to the mortgage note rate minus the MBS coupon rate minus the guarantee fee minus the base servicing fee.
excess servicing fee = mortgage note rate -MBS coupon rate-guarantee fee-base servicing fee
In the example shown in Figure 2 , the excess servicing fee (spread) may be sold to Fannie Mae by buying up the guarantee fee. Another option for mortgage bankers is to retain the excess servicing fee in the portfolio, thereby generating fixed income cash flows during the life of the mortgage.
Similar to the guarantee fee buy-up/buy-down features, the excess servicing fee allows lenders to maximize the present value of revenue.
Model building
The best execution problem can be formulated as an assignment problem. Each mortgage in the model can be assigned either into a MBS with a specific coupon rate or to be sold as a whole loan.
When mortgages are assigned into a MBS, we consider the guarantee fees buy-up/buy-down feature and the servicing retain/sell feature in our model to maximize the total revenue. We formulate the best execution problem as a mixed integer programming problem.
Model description
The objective of the model is to maximize the revenue. Four sources of revenue are included in the model:
(1) Revenue from mortgages pooled into a MBS or sold as a whole loan:
( ) 
We consider the guarantee fee buy-up/buy-down and retain excess servicing fee only if mortgage m is pooled into a MBS. Therefore, when mortgage m is sold as a whole loan, • Data on mortgages: (1) loan amount of each mortgage; (2) time to maturity of each mortgage; (3) note rate of each mortgage; and (4) possible MBS pools for each mortgage assignment.
• Data on MBS: (1) price of MBS (related to maturity and MBS coupon rate)
• Data on multipliers and parameters: (1) base servicing value; (2) guarantee fee buy-down/buy-up multiplier; (3) retain servicing multiplier; (4) upper bounds of guarantee fee buy-up and buy-down; (5) upper bounds of excess servicing fee in loan, group and aggregate levels.
Problem size
The considered dataset:
• 4,355 mortgages.
• Four different times to maturity: 10, 15, 20, 30 years separating mortgages into four groups.
• 13 possible MBS coupon rates from 3.5% to 9.5% increasing in increments of 0.5%.
The problem size:
• 13,065 real variables.
• 66,190 binary variables.
• 30,490 constraints (binary and non-negativity constraints are not included).
Solver
We used CPLEX-90 to solve the large-scale problem on an Intel Pentium 4, 2.8GHz PC. The problem was solved in 15 seconds with a solution gap 4 of less than 0.01%
Solution
The total loan amount of the 4,355 mortgages is $756,426,037. We assumed each mortgage is sold at the price of its loan amount. The total revenue equals the total loan amount ($756,426,037). For the case when each mortgage either being pooled into a MBS or sold as a whole loan for the price of its loan amount, the optimal revenue is $786,620,698, which is $30,194,661 (4%) more than the total loan amount. If each mortgage is sold at the price of its loan amount, the total revenue equals $756,426,037. With the best execution strategy such that each mortgage could be either pooled into a MBS or sold as a whole loan for the price of its loan amount, the revenue is improved to $786,620,698, which is $30,195,014 (4%) more than the total loan amount.
Conclusion
We built a formal model to perform the best execution analysis. The model includes the loan-level best execution for a MBS/whole loan, guarantee fee buy-up/buy-down, and base/excess servicing fee. The model is formulated as a mixed integer programming problem. The case study shows that a realistic large-scale mixed integer problem can be solved in acceptable time 
